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Abstract  
According to the two-factor theory of perfectionism (Stoeber & Otto, 2006), perfectionism 
comprises two superordinate dimensions—perfectionistic strivings (PS) and perfectionistic 
concerns (PC)—that show different, and often opposite, relations with psychological adjustment 
and maladjustment, particularly when their overlap is partialled out. Recently, Hill (2014) raised 
concerns about the interpretation of the relations that PS show after partialling. The present article 
aims to alleviate these concerns. First, we address the concern that partialling changes the 
conceptual meaning of PS. Second, we explain how the relations of residual PS (i.e., PS with PC 
partialled out) differ from those of PS, and how to interpret these differences. In this, we also 
discuss suppressor effects and how mutual suppression affects the relations of both PS and PC 
with outcomes. Furthermore, we provide recommendations of how to report and interpret findings 
of analyses partialling out the effects of PS and PC. We conclude that, if properly understood and 
reported, there is nothing to be concerned about when partialling PS and PC. On the contrary, 
partialling is essential if we want to understand the shared, unique, combined, and interactive 
relations of the different dimensions of perfectionism.  
Keywords: two-factor theory of perfectionism; perfectionistic strivings; perfectionistic 
concerns; partialling; mutual suppression; psychological adjustment; psychological 
maladjustment; 2 × 2 model of perfectionism 
1. Introduction 
Perfectionism comes in different forms which requires a multidimensional framework to 
conceptualize the various aspects of this personality characteristic (Frost, Marten, Lahart, & 
Rosenblate, 1990; Hewitt & Flett, 1991; see also Enns & Cox, 2002). When examining different 
measures of multidimensional perfectionism, however, researchers soon realized that the different 
forms, aspects, and subordinate dimensions of perfectionism can be organized in two 
superordinate factors: perfectionistic strivings and perfectionistic concerns (Frost, Heimberg, Holt, 
Mattia, & Neubauer, 1993; Stoeber & Otto, 2006; see also Cox, Enns, & Clara, 2002; Dunkley, 
Blankstein, Halsall, Williams, & Winkworth, 2000). Perfectionistic strivings (PS)—also called 
personal standards perfectionism—capture forms, aspects, and subordinate dimensions of 
perfectionism reflecting a self-oriented striving for perfection and exceedingly high personal 
standards of performance. In contrast, perfectionistic concerns (PC)—also called evaluative 
concerns perfectionism—capture forms, aspects, and subdimensions of perfectionism reflecting 
PARTIALLING PERFECTIONISTIC STRIVINGS AND CONCERNS  3 
 
concerns over making mistakes, fear of negative social evaluation if not perfect, doubts about 
actions, feelings of discrepancy between one’s high standards and actual performance, and 
negative reactions to imperfection (Stoeber & Otto, 2006; see also Table 1).  
Differentiating PS and PC is important because the two superordinate dimensions frequently 
show different, and often opposite, relations with indicators of psychological adjustment and 
maladjustment (e.g., Frost et al., 1993; Stoeber & Otto, 2006). PC consistently show positive 
relations with indicators of maladjustment, and may show negative relations with indicators of 
psychological adjustment. In contrast, PS often show positive relations with indicators of 
psychological adjustment, and may show negative relations with indicators of psychological 
maladjustment. Of particular interest, all of the aforementioned relations tend to be stronger when 
the overlap between PS and PC is partialled out, controlled for, or otherwise taken into account 
statistically (e.g., Gotwals, Stoeber, Dunn, & Stoll, 2012; R. W. Hill, Huelsman, & Araujo, 2010; 
Stoeber & Otto, 2006).  
In a recent article titled “Perfectionistic strivings and the perils of partialling,” Hill (2014)1 
raised a number of questions regarding the potentially undesirable effects associated with the 
practice of partialling out the effect of PC from the relations of PS with psychological adjustment 
and maladjustment. In particular, Hill raised two main concerns. First, partialling out PC changes 
the “conceptual meaning” of PS, to the extent that what is left after partialling no longer represents 
PS. In fact, Hill argued that the conceptual meaning of PS becomes unclear after partialling out the 
effect of PC. Second, Hill raised the concern that the evidence supporting the adaptive outcomes 
of PS may be the result of suppression effects that may have no correspondence to reality, thus 
suggesting that partialling creates spurious relations (i.e., relations that did not exist before 
partialling) that should not be interpreted.  
Although criticism is a healthy indicator of the maturity of our field, we feel that a careful 
examination is required before rejecting an approach that has been used in many of the theoretical 
and empirical advances over the last three decades. Constructive criticisms, if proven defendable 
and valid, should be accompanied with solutions and/or alternatives to steer research in promising 
directions. Given the current state of the evidence, we feel that it would be premature, if not 
                                               
1Throughout this article, to improve readability, Hill is always A. P. Hill unless otherwise 
indicated. 
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entirely inappropriate, for researchers who are concerned about the issues raised in the Hill’s 
(2014) article to refrain from interpreting the partialled effects of PS (when controlling for PC) 
and PC (when controlling for PS).  
Therefore, our overarching goal in the present article was to address these concerns and 
provide guidance to ensure that researchers can reliably interpret observed effects after partialling. 
Because we intended this article as guidance for a general readership interested in research on 
multidimensional perfectionism, we kept our presentation largely non-technical with the exception 
of discussing the differences between bivariate correlations and partial correlations in greater 
detail. Moreover, we did not elaborate on the practice that the effects of partialling are considered 
problematic only when there is a change in the statistical significance (p < .05) of the relations that 
PS show after partialling (Hill, 2014) which is questionable given the well-known problems of 
null hypothesis significance testing (e.g., Nickerson, 2000).  
Before we come to the core of the matter, however, we need to clarify the terminology we 
selected for this article. We used the term “relations” for any statistical associations between 
variables (e.g., bivariate and partial correlations in correlational analyses; regression coefficients 
and semipartial correlations in regression analyses; path coefficients in structural equation 
models). We used the term “adaptive relations” as a shorthand to denote the positive and negative 
relations of PS with variables that are usually considered adaptive (e.g., conscientiousness, active 
coping, positive affect) and maladaptive (e.g., neuroticism, avoidant coping, negative affect), 
respectively. Conversely, we used the term “maladaptive relations” to denote the positive relations 
with variables that are considered maladaptive and the negative relations with variables that are 
considered adaptive. Finally, we used the term “residual PS” for what Hill (2014) called 
residualized PS (i.e., PS after PC have been partialled out) and the term “residual PC” for what 
Hill called residualized PC (i.e., PC after PS have been partialled out).  
Regarding the structure of this article, we will first present arguments supporting our position 
that partialling does not change the conceptual meaning of PS. Next, we will offer some non-
technical explanations to help readers understand what partialling does when we vary the 
correlations between PS and PC on the one hand, and the correlations of both PS and PC with 
outcomes on the other. We think that clearly delineating different scenarios is needed to 
demonstrate that the suppression effects, outlined as a potential problem by Hill (2014), are 
substantially informative rather than spurious. In addition, we will take the opportunity to point 
out that the suppression effects of PS and PC are mutual rather than exclusive (R. W. Hill et al., 
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2010). As a matter of fact, controlling for PS can augment the maladaptive relations of PC as 
much as controlling for PC can augment the adaptive relations of PS. Informed by this substantial 
and theoretically-based reinterpretation of partialling, we will conclude by presenting 
recommendations on how to report and interpret the results of partialling PS and PC in future 
research.  
2. Is partialling perilous or a theoretically informative approach?  
2.1. Does partialling change the “conceptual meaning” of PS?  
As a first main concern, Hill (2014) contended that partialling out PC from PS changes the 
“conceptual meaning” of PS. According to Hill, PS share some definitional features (e.g., 
conditional self-acceptance, self-criticism) with PC. Hence, what is left after partialling out these 
shared features is conceptually different from PS. Furthermore, Hill regarded some of the features 
that PS share with PC as core conceptual characteristics that define the “perfectionistic” in PS. 
After partialling, PS are thought to be left without these core definitional features to the extent that 
PS now represent some kind of “conscientious achievement strivings” that are essentially non-
perfectionistic and thus can tell us little, if anything, about perfectionism (for similar arguments, 
see Flett & Hewitt, 2014; Hall, 2006).  
There are a number of reasons why we do not share Hill’s (2014) concerns and do not agree 
with his line of argument. First, it is possible to define PS and PC without making reference to the 
features that Hill considered defining characteristics of perfectionism (e.g., conditional self-
acceptance, self-criticism). People can strive for perfection without making their self-worth 
contingent upon achieving perfection, or without criticizing themselves if they fail to reach 
perfection. Consequently, the characteristics that Hill claimed to be defining characteristics of PS 
are better conceptualized as correlates of perfectionism to be studied separately from PS and PC. 
Take, for example, conditional self-acceptance. Conditional self-acceptance and closely related 
constructs (e.g., contingent self-worth) have shown positive correlations with PS and PC, but the 
correlations are not so large as to suggest that they should be defining characteristics. Instead, such 
constructs are better examined separately from PS and PC (e.g., DiBartolo, Frost, Chang, LaSota, 
& Grills, 2004; Sturman, Flett, Hewitt, & Rudolph, 2009) as demonstrated by Hill and his 
colleagues in the case of unconditional self-acceptance (Hill, Hall, Appleton, & Kozub, 2008). For 
self-criticism, the relation with PS is even weaker. Like conditional self-acceptance, self-criticism 
has shown positive correlations with PS and PC. The correlations with PS, however, are 
considerably smaller than those with PC (e.g., Dunkley, Zuroff, & Blankstein, 2006). This pattern 
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of relations suggests that self-criticism is closely related to PC, but not to PS (Dunkley et al., 
2006; Sherry, Stoeber, & Ramasubbu, 2016). Consequently, evidence is lacking to suggest that 
either conditional self-acceptance or self-criticism should be considered defining characteristics of 
PS.  
Second, we believe that accepting the line of argument put forward by Hill (2014) has the 
potential of steering perfectionism research in the wrong direction. If the characteristics that PS 
share with PC are core defining characteristics of PS—and if everything that is “perfectionistic” 
about PS is contained in the parts that PS share with PC—there would be little need to invest 
theoretical and empirical effort to study PS. Consider the Venn diagram in Figure 1 representing 
the relations of PS, PC, and an outcome variable Y. If the core defining characteristics of PS are 
those shared with PC (Figure 1, a + d), everything that is perfectionistic in PS would be contained 
in PC. If researchers were to accept this argument as valid, this would mean a return to the one-
dimensional conceptions of perfectionism of the 1980s that either exclusively focused on PC or 
did not differentiate PS and PC (Burns, 1980; Garner, Olstead, & Polivy, 1983; Pacht, 1984).  
Third, even though PS and PC often show large-sized positive correlations, we are convinced 
that it is possible to strive for perfection without being concerned about imperfection (and vice 
versa). Both conceptual arguments and empirical evidence can be called upon to defend this 
position. On conceptual grounds, the positive correlations between PS and PC can easily be 
misinterpreted as evidence that everyone who has a high (or a low) score on PS also has a high (or 
a low) score on PC and vice versa. This is not the case. As a example, imagine two students, 
Student A and Student B, who are about to take a multiple choice exam. Both students are high in 
PS and consequently strive to achieve a perfect result (say, 100 points out of 100). However, only 
Student B is also high in PC and consequently worries about what will happen upon failing to 
achieve a perfect result (i.e., 100 points). If you follow the line of argument put forward by Hill 
(2014), only individuals with a pattern of perfectionism comparable to Student B would show PS 
because they also show high levels of PC. In contrast, individuals like Student A would not show 
PS because they do not show PC. Note that PS and PC are different pieces of the perfectionism 
puzzle. As such, returning to our example, we would argue that both students—Student A and 
Student B—show PS because both are striving for a perfect result. One cannot substitute, guess, or 
infer an individual’s PS score on the basis of their PC score (or vice versa). The positive 
correlations between PS and PC should be taken as evidence that, on average, individuals who 
have a high (or a low) score on PS also have a high (or a low) score on PC and vice versa. It 
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should not be taken as evidence that studying either PS or PC is a sufficient condition to 
understand the whole picture of the perfectionism construct.  
On empirical grounds, it is important to note that the positive correlations between PS and 
PC are usually not higher than r = .60 (Gotwals et al., 2012; Stoeber & Otto, 2006), meaning that 
PS explain no more than 36% of variance in PC (and vice versa). This means that there will be 
many individuals who are high in PS, but not high in PC. Furthermore, consider the 2 × 2 model 
of perfectionism (Gaudreau & Thompson, 2010; see also Gaudreau, 2012, 2013) which presents a 
theoretical and analytic framework to examine the shared, unique, combined, and interactive 
effects of PS and PC. To this end, the model differentiates four within-person combinations 
(called “subtypes”) of perfectionism: pure PS (high PS, low PC), pure PC (low PS, high PC), 
mixed perfectionism (high PS, high PC), and non-perfectionism (low PS, low PC). Recently, 
Gaudreau (2015) published findings from two studies in which participants were asked to self-
categorize into one of the four subtypes of the 2 × 2 model. Results showed that 37-46% of 
participants self-classified as the pure PS subtype and 11-16% as the pure PC subtype whereas 
only 23-24% self-classified as the mixed perfectionism subtype (and 18-25% as the non-
perfectionism subtype). The fact that a substantial percentage of individuals have unmatched 
mental representations about their levels of PS and PC (that is, representations where their level of 
PS does not match their level or PC, or vice versa) indicates that the two superordinate dimensions 
of perfectionism are not as closely intertwined as suggested based on the fact that PS and PC often 
show large-sized positive correlations. 
Overall, in principle, people can show PS without PC as much as they can show PS with PC. 
Therefore, as researchers, we can statistically remove PC from PS and still have PS (if residual 
PS). However, we agree with Hill (2014) that residual PS need to be differently interpreted from 
PS, which leads us to the second main concern expressed in Hill’s article.  
2.2. How can we (better) understand the effects of partialling? 
Following Lynam, Hoyle, and Newman (2006), Hill (2014) used multiple regressions to 
compute residual PS and then compared the correlations of residual PS and raw scores of PS with 
indicators of psychological adjustment and maladjustment. In line with previous research 
(Gotwals et al., 2012; R. W. Hill et al., 2010; Stoeber & Otto, 2006), Hill found that residual PS 
show larger adaptive relations than PS. Differently from previous research, however, Hill 
concluded that these findings show that partialling PS is “perilous” because removing PC from PS 
makes PS look more adaptive than they actually are. On the one hand, this argument implies that 
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the correlations estimated with residual PS are less real or less valid than those estimated with raw 
scores of PS. On the other hand, this criticism makes partialling look like some statistical trickery 
that has no correspondence in (or relevance for) the real world.  
Although we disagree with the argument that partialling is perilous, we nonetheless concur 
that proper interpretation of residual PS is warranted if we want to move perfectionism research 
forward. To that intent, in the next section we will try to demonstrate the appropriate conceptual 
meaning and substantive interpretation of residual PS using both conceptual scenarios and a real-
life “anxiety scenario.”  
2.2.1. What to expect when partialling PS  
To our knowledge, both theory and empirical research have never delineated and analyzed 
what relations should be expected across varying scenarios of relations between PS, PC, and 
adjustment/maladjustment. Therefore, we created Table 2 in order to (better) understand what 
should happen—and what to expect—when PC are partialled out of the relations between PS and 
an outcome variable (hereafter denoted as Y). Table 2 shows the expected partial correlation 
pr(PS, Y) for all combinations of zero-, small-, medium-, and large-sized correlations between PS, 
PC, and Y and small-, medium-, large-sized, and very-large-sized (r = .70) positive correlations 
between PS and PC.2 All these combinations are realistic patterns that have been reported in the 
perfectionism literature (e.g., Gotwals et al., 2012; Stoeber & Otto, 2006).  
Two things are noteworthy in the pattern of partial correlations in Table 2. First, as Hill 
(2014) already pointed out, the effect of partialling increases with the size of the positive PS-PC 
correlation: As the PS-PC correlation increases, so does the difference between r(PS, Y) and 
pr(PS, Y). To understand this point, imagine a scenario in which PS and performance show a 
small positive correlation (r = .10) and PC and performance show a small negative correlation (r = 
–.10). When PS and PC show a very large correlation (r = .70), the relation between residual PS 
and performance will be moderate (pr = .24) whereas it will be small (pr = .14) when PS and PC 
show only a medium-sized correlation (r = .30). Second, the effect of partialling also increases 
with the difference between the PS-Y correlation and the PC-Y correlation: As the difference 
between the PS-Y correlation and the PC-Y correlation increases, so does the difference between 
                                               
2In this, we followed Cohen (1992) who regarded correlations with absolute values of .10, .30, and 
.50 as small-, medium-, and large-sized.  
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r(PS, Y) and pr(PS, Y). Imagine that the PS-PC correlation is of medium size (r = .30). When PC 
show a small negative correlation with performance (r = –.10; as in our previous example), the 
relation between residual PS and performance will be small (pr = .14 versus r = .10). However, 
when PC show a large negative correlation with performance (r =  
–.50), the relation between residual PS and performance (pr = .30) will be three times the size of 
the relation between PS and performance (r = .10).  
Why is this important to know? It is rather easy to get surprised and understandable to feel 
skeptical when PS show larger adaptive relations after partialling out PC, particularly when these 
relations contradict the theoretical viewpoint that perfectionism is through and through 
maladaptive (cf. Blatt, 1996; Greenspon, 2000). However, from a mathematical standpoint, there 
is nothing to be surprised or skeptical about because this is exactly what is to be expected in the 
potential scenarios shown in Table 2. Thus, Table 2 not only helps to prevent surprises. It also can 
be used to generate—and test—specific hypotheses about the relations that residual PS (and, as we 
will discuss later, residual PC) are expected to show with indicators of psychological adjustment 
and maladjustment based on prior knowledge of the bivariate correlations between PS, PC, and Y.  
2.2.2. How the effects of partialling translate to individuals 
Furthermore, we think that concerns about partialling are potentially aggravated when this 
technique is described as “removing” the variance that PS share with PC, because this suggests 
that common aspects are removed and consequently the construct is changed (see Figure 1 and 
imagine removing a + d from PS). This, however, is not the case. PS, as a predictor, is not 
changed. The reason is that partialling removes the variance in the dependent variable that is 
already explained by the other predictor (here PC) rather than variance in the predictors 
themselves. Therefore, a better way to describe partialling, which may avoid these concerns, is to 
describe partialling as a statistical technique that controls for the PS-PC overlap by keeping PC 
constant (see again Figure 1, but now imagine keeping a + d constant).  
Statistically removing variance and keeping a variable constant are the same thing, but the 
latter may help us better understand what exactly happens when PC are partialled and why the 
relations of residual PS often show stark differences to those of PS. In the case of two independent 
variables (PS and PC), statistically controlling for one independent variable (PC) is like holding 
this variable constant and examining only the effects that the other variable (PS) has on the 
outcome variable. This is like statistically creating a sample in which all participants have the 
same level of PC (= constant) and then examining the relations that PS would show in such a 
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sample. It is also similar to creating an experiment in which the conditions are tightly controlled 
by the experimenter to ensure that the observed effect can be solely attributed to the primary 
independent variable (see Bernerth & Aguinis, 2016). Of course, personality traits cannot be 
manipulated by the experimenter, so holding constant using statistical methods has been the 
preferred approach of researchers studying individual differences.  
Some of the arguments presented by Hill (2014) are likely to be interpreted as if suggesting 
that the results of partialling create statistical constellations that have no correspondence in the 
real world. We disagree with this criticism but concede that the idea of “holding constant” 
deserves to be explained in non-technical language that everyone can easily understand. To this 
end, consider the following “anxiety scenario.” This scenario presents a constellation that, at a first 
glance, might appear counterintuitive because partialling turns a maladaptive relation into an 
adaptive relation. For this scenario, let us assume a hypothetical study in which PS and PC show a 
large-sized positive correlation of r = .50, which is frequently the case in the literature (e.g., 
Stoeber & Otto, 2006). Let us further assume that PS and PC both show positive bivariate 
correlations with anxiety (a maladaptive outcome), but PS show a small-sized positive correlation 
(r = .10) whereas PC show a large-sized positive correlation (r = .50), which is approximately the 
pattern of correlations that was found in a study on competitive anxiety in athletes (Stoeber, Otto, 
Pescheck, Becker, & Stoll, 2007). As shown in Table 2, partialling out PC would result in PS 
showing a negative partial correlation of pr = –.20 with anxiety: The maladaptive relation of PS 
has disappeared and turned into an adaptive relation. Before partialling, PS showed a positive 
relation with anxiety (indicating that people high in PS are more anxious than people low in 
perfectionist strivings), but after partialling PS show a negative relation (indicating that people 
high in PS are less anxious).  
We agree that such differences between PS and residual PS might appear counterintuitive. 
However, both findings are mathematically appropriate and substantially interpretable. In fact, 
they provide different yet complementary information that deserves to be wholeheartedly 
interpreted and considered for theoretical development. If we take any two individuals from the 
study’s sample, the individual with higher PS will on average be more anxious than the individual 
with lower PS (because PS show a positive bivariate relation with anxiety). However, if we take 
two individuals who have the same level of PC (= constant), the individual with higher PS will on 
average be less anxious than the individual with lower PS (because PS show a negative relation 
with anxiety when PC are partialled out, that is, held constant). As this example demonstrates, 
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bivariate correlations and partial relations (i.e., partial correlations, unique effects in multiple 
regressions, paths in structural equation models) have their own substantive meaning and deserve 
to be interpreted accordingly. Partialling does not create relations that have no correspondence in 
reality or are “not there” before partialling. On the contrary, partialling uncovers relations that can 
only be discovered and interpreted with a multivariate statistical approach that matches the 
multidimensional nature of the perfectionism construct.  
2.2.3. A short note on suppression 
A final, albeit closely related concern of Hill (2014) was that the effects described in the 
previous section (and detailed in Table 2) represent suppression effects which researchers are 
often uncomfortable with because they can be difficult to understand (Meyers, Gamst, & Guarino, 
2005). The classic suppressor situation (Horst, 1941) is when a first predictor X1 shows no 
bivariate relation with the dependent variable Y (r = .00), but shows a bivariate relation with a 
second predictor X2 that shows a bivariate relation with Y. When X1 and X2 are simultaneously 
entered into a regression predicting Y, X1 will show a regression weight differently from zero 
indicating that X1 has a relation with Y when the overlap with X2 is controlled for. Because 
mathematically equivalent (R. L. Smith, Ager, & Williams, 1992), the same effect occurs when 
X2 is partialled out of the relations between X1 and Y: The bivariate correlation of X1 and Y is 
zero, but the partial correlation of X1 and Y is different from zero (see the entries in Table 2 for 
r[PS, Y] = .00 and any r[PC, Y]  .00).  
The classic explanation for suppression effects is that the predictor responsible for the 
suppressor effect (the suppressor variable, here X2) enhances the importance of the other predictor 
(here X1) because it (X2) suppresses variance that is “irrelevant” to the prediction of Y 
(Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). This explanation, however, is not helpful in the present context, for 
two reasons. First, it is difficult to imagine what the irrelevant variance should be that PC suppress 
when partialled out of the relations that PS show with Y. (Looking at Figure 1, for example, d is 
surely not irrelevant.) Second, and more importantly, both PS and PC are suppressor variables. 
Hence, PS and PC create a “suppression situation” (Tzelgov & Henik, 1991) mutually enhancing 
their predictive validity (see Section 3 below). Suppression situations go beyond the classic 
suppressor situation described above. Instead, suppression situations include all situations where 
both predictors change their predictive validity when entered together in predicting an outcome, 
for example, by changing signs (a significant positive predictor becomes a significant negative 
predictor and vice versa), by showing increased validity (the predictor’s partial correlation is 
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larger than its bivariate correlation), or both—as is the case when partialling PS and PC (see Table 
2).  
Fortunately, the suppression situation created by partialling the effects of PS and PC is not 
difficult to understand and is easily explainable. PS have adaptive aspects, as is demonstrated by 
the many studies that found PS to show adaptive relations when bivariate correlations are 
examined (i.e., without PC being partialled out; e.g., Gotwals et al., 2012; Stoeber & Otto, 2006; 
see also Hill, 2014; Hill & Curran, 2016). However, because PS and PC overlap, PS’ adaptive 
relations are often suppressed by the maladaptive relations that PC show, and consequently may 
only show when PC are partialled out (Gotwals et al., 2012; Hill, 2014; Stoeber & Otto, 2006; see 
also Stoeber, Kobori, & Brown, 2015). Because PS show positive relations with PC, the overlap 
with PC often “masks” the adaptive relations of PS—particularly as the adaptive relations that PS 
show are usually weaker than the maladaptive relations that PC show.  
The suppression effects of PS and PC are theoretically interpretable and empirically 
replicable. There are not many reliable and replicable suppression situations in personality 
research (Paulhus, Robins, Trzesniewski, & Tracy, 2004). Consequently, we see the discovery that 
PS and PC represent a reliable and replicable suppression situation—with findings replicated 
across different research groups (e.g., Gotwals et al., 2012; Hill, 2014; R. W. Hill et al., 2010; 
Stoeber & Otto, 2006)—as a significant achievement of perfectionism research, particularly in 
light of the current crisis of confidence regarding the replicability of findings in psychological 
science (e.g., Asendorpf et al., 2013; Pashler & Wagenmakers, 2012). Moreover, the suppression 
effects in the PS-PC relations are not spurious effects that unexpectedly appear in multivariate 
analyses and are difficult (if not impossible) to explain. They are effects that should be expected 
(see Table 2) and are, as shown in the previous paragraph, easily explained. Furthermore, the 
suppression effects are theoretically important because they are mutual. Not only do PC suppress 
the adaptive relations of PS, but PS also suppress the maladaptive relations of PC.  
3. What about residual PC? 
Although the effects that partialling has on the relations of PS have received considerable 
attention and are regarded as problematic by some researchers (Hill, 2014; see also Flett & Hewitt, 
2014; Molnar & Sirois, 2016), researchers often ignore that partialling also affects the relations of 
PC. Residual PC—that is, PC with PS partialled out—usually show larger maladaptive relations 
than PC (Hill, 2014; R. W. Hill et al., 2010). Yet, Hill (2014) argues that the effects that partialling 
has on the relations of PC are unproblematic because PC are “less controversial” (p. 310). We find 
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this a peculiar argument. Researchers who accept the argument that partialling PC from PS is 
problematic (because partialling changes the conceptual meaning of PS) should logically accept 
the mirror argument that partialling PS from PC is equally problematic (because partialling 
changes the conceptual meaning of PC). If partialling is perilous, the perils should apply equally to 
PS and PC.  
Three main reasons could explicate why the mirror argument has not been equally accepted 
and defended by researchers. First, the effects of partialling PS from the relations of PC are not as 
“dramatic” as those of partialling PC from the relations of PS. The differences between PC and 
residual PC are usually not as large as those between PS and residual PS (Hill, 2014; R. W. Hill et 
al., 2010). Second, PC do not become less maladaptive when PS are partialled out. Instead, they 
become more maladaptive. What is more, partialling PS from PC does not turn maladaptive 
relations into adaptive relations. Third, and perhaps more importantly, the effect that partialling 
has on PC—making PC more maladaptive—is consistent with the traditional view of 
perfectionism as a personality disposition that is essentially maladaptive (e.g., Burns, 1980; 
Horney, 1950; Pacht, 1984). In contrast, the effect that partialling has on PS—making PS more 
adaptive—is inconsistent with the traditional view.  
Nevertheless, we think that researchers (particularly those interested in the maladaptive 
relations of perfectionism) should take greater note of these effects because they indicate that PC 
are even more maladaptive than is apparent from their bivariate correlations with indicators of 
psychological adjustment and maladjustment. The reason is that PC overlap with PS which often 
show adaptive relations, and consequently the maladaptive relations of PC are often attenuated. 
Only when we examine the relations of residual PC (i.e., the unique relations of PC when holding 
PS constant) does the true extent of PC’ maladaptiveness become apparent.3 Consequently, 
partialling is important because it shows us not only the extent to which residual PS are adaptive, 
but also the extent to which residual PC are maladaptive.  
4. Further considerations and reflections  
Despite our confident stance toward partialling, there are two issues that warrant further 
attention. First, Hill (2014) questioned the reliability of the residual scores of PS and PC. We 
                                               
3Interchange PS and PC in Table 2 and you get the effects that partialling has on PC, and how 
residual PC differ from PC.  
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agree this could be problematic in multiple regressions, although this type of generic concern 
should not be seen as specific to partial correlations and regression analyses involving PS and PC. 
Moreover, the scales used to measure PS and PC usually show high internal consistency (i.e., 
Cronbach’s alphas > .80), particularly when multiple subscales capturing indicators of PS and PC 
are combined (cf. Table 1). As such, the residual scores of PS and PC should have sufficient 
reliability. Furthermore, there are nowadays statistical techniques (e.g., confirmatory factor 
analysis, exploratory structural equation modeling) widely available to create latent variables in 
which measurement error can be separated from the true score. As such, concerns for the lack of 
reliability of residual scores can be directly addressed and minimized by taking into account the 
imperfect nature of measures. As eloquently expressed by Asparouhov, Muthén, and Morin (2015, 
p. 1563), “psychometric indicators are seldom perfectly pure construct indicators.” If anything, 
our desire to blindly treat PS and PC as if they were naturally existing “things” rather than “latent 
properties” has potentially lead to a situation in which the effects of PS and PC on adjustment and 
maladjustment have been conservatively underestimated (e.g., Fan, 2003).  
Second, there is the issue that the relations that residual PS and residual PC show do not take 
into account the shared variance between PS and PC (cf. Molnar & Sirois, 2016). This variance, 
however, can be substantial (see Figure 1, a + d). When regression approaches are used (e.g., 
ordinary least square regression) and PS and PC are simultaneously entered as predictors of an 
outcome variable Y, only the resulting R² (which multiplied by 100 represents the percentage of 
variance in Y explained by PS and PC) includes the shared variance between PS, PC, and Y 
(Figure 1, d). The regression coefficients—representing the unique relations of PS (Figure 1, b) 
and PC (Figure 1, c)—do not include the shared variance (Figure 1, d), and neither do the 
respective partial correlations. Consequently, the relations resulting from partialling underestimate 
the overall contribution that PS and PC make in explaining variance in Y. Some statistical 
procedures may present a solution to this problem (e.g., regression communality analysis; Nimon, 
2010) which we will leave for future research to explore because they require a discussion of 
advanced statistics that goes far beyond the scope of the present article. Furthermore, this requires 
addressing the question what the overlap of PS and PC represents theoretically and conceptually. 
One possibility would be that the overlap represents the common qualities that make PS and PC 
“perfectionistic” (e.g., strong personal beliefs about the importance of perfection; Campbell & Di 
Paula, 2002). Another possibility is that the overlap represents a “general factor of perfectionism” 
(similar to Spearman’s g factor representing a general factor of intelligence in research on mental 
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abilities) as suggested by a recent publication (M. M. Smith & Saklofske, in press).  
5. Recommendations and concluding comments  
5.1. Recommendations 
Although we believe that—once properly understood and interpreted—the advantages 
clearly outweigh the disadvantages of partialling, we agree with a number of recommendations 
proposed by Hill (2014). First, researchers need to differentiate between PS and residual PS when 
reporting and discussing findings where the two show different relations.4 Furthermore, we agree 
with Hill that more caution needs to be exerted when discussing the relations of residual PS by 
making clear to readers that these relations are the relations that PS show when PC are held 
constant (see also Lynam et al., 2006). One way to do so is to follow Hill (2014) and describe 
these relations as relations of residual PS and residual PC (compared to relations of PS and PC) 
which to some ears may sound rather “technical.” Another way would be to describe the relations 
as the unique relations of PS and PC (compared to their bivariate relations) which we think is 
preferable.  
Second, to give readers the full picture, it is important to always report the bivariate 
correlations upon which the multivariate model involving partialling is built. This is pivotal for 
ensuring that readers can see the relations of PS with Y including PC (Figure 1, b + d) and 
compare them to the unique relations of PS excluding PC (Figure 1, b). Reporting all bivariate 
correlations on which multivariate analyses are based is not only considered good practice in 
multivariate statistics (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007), but is essential if we want to understand the 
effects that partialling has on the relations that PS show and how the relations of residual PS differ 
from those of PS. The same holds for the relations of PC and residual PC.  
These recommendations should also help researchers report and understand the results of 
analyses not only when two dimensions of perfectionism—PS and PC or their respective 
indicators (Table 1)—are regarded, but also when the unique relations of more than two 
superordinate dimensions of perfectionism are regarded (e.g., M. M. Smith, Saklofske, Stoeber, & 
Sherry, in press) as well as when more than two forms, aspects, and subordinate dimensions of 
perfectionism are investigated and their bivariate and unique relations with relevant criterion 
variables are examined (e.g., Stoeber, 2014a; Stoeber & Childs, 2010).  
                                               
4The same goes, of course, for PC and residual PC.  
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In addition, we would recommend that researchers also probe for possible interactions effects 
of PS and PC. The reason is that a significant multiplicative PS × PC effect—a moderating 
effect—should be taken as evidence that the valence and/or strength of the relation of PC varies 
across levels of PS. Moderating effects are symmetrical (Cohen, Cohen, Aiken, & West, 2003) 
which implies that the valence and/or strength of the relation of PS also varies across levels of PC. 
In the presence of a moderating effect, simple slopes analyses are recommended to properly 
estimate the effect of PS across different levels of PC as well as the effect of PC across different 
levels of PS. For that matter, the 2 × 2 model of perfectionism (Gaudreau & Thompson, 2010) 
offers a series of testable hypotheses that can help reinterpret the effects of PS and PC when the 
multiplicative PS × PC is statistically significant (see also Gaudreau, 2012; Gaudreau, Franche, & 
Gareau, in press) as well as when it is not statistically significant (e.g., Gaudreau, 2012). In each 
case, the 2 × 2 model was proposed as a way to investigate the effect of different within-person 
combinations of PS and PC (i.e., “subtypes” of perfectionism) in order to embrace the richness of 
a multidimensional conceptualization of perfectionism when examining the effects of PS and PC 
using multiple regression, structural equation modeling, and multilevel modeling. 
5.2. Concluding comments 
Hill’s (2014) critique of partialling PS ends with the statement that it is unclear what residual 
PS measure. We hope that the present article provides some necessary clarification to alleviate the 
major concerns that Hill’s article raised about partialling. Perfectionism is a multidimensional 
construct. Hence, it requires a multidimensional theory and multivariate reasoning and analyses. 
The numerous studies that used partialling techniques to examine residual PS and residual PC—
which include many studies by Hill and colleagues (e.g., Hill & Curran, 2016; Hill et al., 2008; 
Hill, Hall, Appleton, & Murray, 2010)—have yielded important insights into the complexities of 
multidimensional perfectionism and the different, often opposite, relations that PS and PC show 
with indicators of psychological adjustment and maladjustment.  
To us, there are currently no satisfactory alternatives to partialling if we want to understand 
the shared (bivariate) and unique (partialled) relations that different dimensions of perfectionism 
show with psychological adjustment and maladjustment (cf. Appendix). Furthermore, there is no 
alternative to partialling if we also want to understand their combined and interactive relations. 
Note that the 2 × 2 model of perfectionism (Gaudreau & Thompson, 2010), which is a theoretical 
and analytic framework expanding on the two-factor theory of perfectionism, uses a regression 
approach to examine the unique, combined, and interactive effects of residual PS and residual PC 
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(Gaudreau, 2012, 2013; Gaudreau et al., in press). Studies following this framework—which again 
include studies by Hill and colleagues (e.g., Hill, 2013; Hill & Davis, 2014)—have provided 
important new insights into the adaptive relations of residual PS (particularly when combined with 
low levels of residual PC) as well as the maladaptive relations of residual PC (particularly when 
combined with low levels of residual PS). These insights help us better understand the dual nature 
of perfectionism and why perfectionism has been described as a “double-edged sword” (Molnar, 
Reker, Culp, Sadava, & DeCourville, 2006; Stoeber, 2014b) that not only has maladaptive aspects 
that undermine psychological health, promote psychological maladjustment, and put people at risk 
 of developing physical and mental health problems, but also has adaptive aspects that may 
protect psychological health and promote psychological adjustment. Partialling perfectionistic 
strivings and perfectionistic concerns helps us better understand this dual nature.  
Appendix 
No Satisfactory Alternatives to Partialling 
Some researchers have suggested to employ person-centered approaches allowing 
researchers to examine different configurations of high versus low PS and PC without losing the 
variance shared by PS and PC (e.g., Boone, Soenens, Braet, & Goossens, 2010; Molnar & Sirois, 
2016). Person-centered approaches, however, have the problem that they cannot differentiate 
between the shared, unique, and interactive contributions that PS and PC make in predicting an 
outcome. Furthermore, person-centered approaches based on cluster analytical procedures usually 
arrive at clusters with significant differences in PS and PC leaving it unclear whether the 
differences that the clusters show in the outcome are attributed to differences in PS or differences 
in PC. Take, for example, the study by Boone et al. (2010) that used cluster analysis, arrived at a 
four-cluster solution, and found that the mixed perfectionism cluster (high PS, high PC) showed 
higher levels of disordered eating than both the high PS cluster (high PS, average PC) and the high 
PC cluster (average PS, high PC). Unfortunately, the mixed perfectionism cluster also showed 
higher levels of PS than the high PS cluster, and higher levels of PC than the high PC cluster, 
leaving it unclear whether the higher levels of disordered eating the mixed perfectionism cluster 
showed were attributable to PS, to PC, or to some combination of PS and PC. (Readers who may 
contemplate employing median-split procedures to PS and PC scores in order to create groups 
with comparable levels of high vs. low PS and PC should note that such procedures are not 
advisable because they decrease reliability, introduce classification errors, and often yield 
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misleading results; Cohen, 1983; MacCallum et al., 2002.)  
Furthermore, researchers have suggested to employ factor-analytic approaches differentiating 
PS and PC while keeping a “general factor” of perfectionism that would contain the shared 
variance (e.g., Molnar & Sirois, 2016). One such approach was recently tested by M. M. Smith 
and Saklofske (in press) who presented a bifactor model of perfectionism differentiating PS, PC, 
and a general perfectionism factor. Note, however, that bifactor models—while providing reliable 
scores for the general factor (here general perfectionism)—have problems providing reliable 
scores for the specific factors (here PS and PC) when the specific factors are highly correlated (as 
was the case for PS and PC) or are estimated with indicators that show low loadings on the 
specific factors (as was the case for two indicators used to model PC). In this case, a correlated 
factor model (without a general factor) provides more reliable scores for the specific factors 
(DeMars, 2013). Further note that bifactor models also involve partialling—the specific factor 
scores are residual scores controlling for the general factor—and hence would be subject to the 
same concerns that Hill raised in his 2014 article and we addressed in the present article.  
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Table 1 
Indicators of Perfectionistic Strivings and Perfectionistic Concerns: Examples 
Scale Perfectionistic strivings Perfectionistic concerns 
FMPS Personal standards  Concern over mistakes  
 Pure personal standardsa Concern over mistakes + doubts about actionsb 
HF-MPS  Self-oriented perfectionismc Socially prescribed perfectionism 
APS-R High standards Discrepancy 
PI Striving for excellence Concern over mistakes  
MIPS Striving for perfection Negative reactions to imperfection 
Note. Scales are listed in chronological order of their first publication. FMPS = Frost 
Multidimensional Perfectionism Scale (Frost et al., 1990); HF-MPS = Hewitt-Flett 
Multidimensional Perfectionism Scale (Hewitt & Flett, 1991, 2004); APS-R = revised Almost 
Perfect Scale (Slaney, Rice, Mobley, Trippi, & Ashby, 2001); PI = Perfectionism Inventory (R. 
W. Hill et al., 2004); MIPS = Multidimensional Inventory of Perfectionism in Sport (Stoeber, 
Otto, Pescheck, Becker, & Stoll, 2007). Table adapted from Stoeber and Damian (2016, p. 276).  
aSee DiBartolo, Frost, Chang, LaSoto, and Grills (2004).  
bSee Stöber (1998). 
cparticularly the subscale capturing striving for perfection (cf. Stoeber & Childs, 2010) 
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Table 2 
Partial Correlations of Perfectionistic Strivings (PS) and Y Controlling for 
Perfectionistic Concerns (PC) for Different Combinations of Correlations of PS, 
PC, and Y  
  r(PS, PC)a 
r(PS, Y) r(PC, Y) .10 .30 .50 .70 
.50 .50 .52 .42 .33 .24 
 .30 .50 .45 .42 .43 
 .10 .49 .50 .52 .61 
 .00 .50 .52 .58 .70 
 –.10 .52 .56 .64 .80 
 –.30 .56 .65 .79 — 
 –.50 .64 .79 — — 
.30 .50 .29 .18 .07 –.08 
 .30 .28 .23 .18 .13 
 .10 .29 .28 .29 .32 
 .00 .30 .31 .35 .42 
 –.10 .31 .35 .41 .52 
 –.30 .35 .43 .54 .75 
 –.50 .41 .54 .73 — 
.10 .50 .06 –.06 –.20 –.40 
 .30 .07 .01 –.06 –.16 
 .10 .09 .07 .06 .04 
 .00 .10 .10 .12 .14 
 –.10 .11 .14 .17 .24 
 –.30 .14 .21 .30 .46 
 –.50 .17 .30 .47 .73 
.00 .50 –.06 –.18 –.33 –.57 
 .30 –.03 –.10 –.18 –.31 
 .10 –.01 –.03 –.06 –.10 
 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 
 –.10 .01 .03 .06 .10 
 –.30 .03 .10 .18 .31 
 –.50 .06 .18 .33 .57 
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–.10 .50 –.17 –.30 –.47 –.73 
 .30 –.14 –.21 –.30 –.46 
 .10 –.11 –.14 –.17 –.24 
 .00 –.10 –.10 –.12 –.14 
 –.10 –.09 –.07 –.06 –.04 
 –.30 –.07 –.01 .06 .16 
 –.50 –.06 .06 .20 .40 
–.30 .50 –.41 –.54 –.73 — 
 .30 –.35 –.43 –.54 –.75 
 .10 –.31 –.35 –.41 –.52 
 .00 –.30 –.31 –.35 –.42 
 –.10 –.29 –.28 –.29 –.32 
 –.30 –.28 –.23 –.18 –.13 
 –.50 –.29 –.18 –.07 .08 
–.50 .50 –.64 –.79 — — 
 .30 –.56 –.65 –.79 — 
 .10 –.52 –.56 –.64 –.80 
 .00 –.50 –.52 –.58 –.70 
 –.10 –.49 –.50 –.52 –.61 
 –.30 –.50 –.45 –.42 –.43 
 –.50 –.52 –.42 –.33 –.24 
Note. r = bivariate correlation. The numbers in the table cells show the partial 
correlation pr(PS, Y) resulting from partialling perfectionistic concerns (PC) from 
the relations of perfectionistic strivings (PS) and Y following the formula pr(PS, 
Y) = {r(PS, Y) – [r(PS, PC) × r(PC, Y)]}  {[1 – r(PS, PC)²] × [1 – r(PC, 
Y)²]}. — = not computable (computing the partial correlation results in out-of-
range values). 
aWhen PS and PC are uncorrelated (r = .00), partialling has no effect and the 
partial correlations are identical to the bivariate correlations. Hence r(PS, PC) = 
.00 was omitted from Table 2. 





Figure 1. Venn diagram representing the shared variance of perfectionistic strivings 
(PS), perfectionistic concerns (PC), and an outcome variable (Y). Partialling 
controls for the shared variance of PS and PC indicated by a + d and uncovers the 
unique relations that PS (indicated by b) and PC (indicated by c) have with Y.  
